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This paper  assesses  the potent,ial  significance  of sanctions
employers  of illegal  aliens for  resource  allocatjon and  jncome
in the United  States.  Data  from  the 1980  Census  of Population
ident'i  fy the jndustries 1ikely to be monjtored  most  closeiy by
immigration  authorities.  After compiling  a list  of industries
monitored,  a general  equilibrium incidence  ana'lysis  is carried
alternative assumptions  about  the overal  I  level of enforcement.
are made  of the effects of sanctions  on U.S. oroduction  and  the
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The Imrnigration  Reform  and Contr"ol  Act of  1986  marked  a new  phase  in
efforts  to control illegal  jmmigration  into the united States.l
Previously, immigration  contnol had  been  achieved  through  border  patrol and
deportation  of illegal  al  iens apprehended  in raids on  worksltes.  The  new
law  adds  sanctions  against  employers  of illegal  immjgrants  to the means
already  available to authoritjes.  Prior to the implementation  of the 1986
1aw,  employers  who  knowingly  hjred i11ega1  aliens faced  no risk  of
p  un  i shme  nt.
Early indications were  that the new  law  was  having  significant effects.
Border  crossings  had  decl  ined significantly  and  there were  numerous  reports
of employers  firing  undocumented  workers,  a1l before  the sanctions  had
become  effectjve.2  The  long-run  effects of the law  are 1ikely to be very
djfferent  from  the short-run  effects, however. hlhile  employers  may  have
been  cautious  in hiring illegals  initially,  they are likely  to adiust thejr
behavior  once  they become  familiar with the law and  the pattern of
enforcement.  \rJith  more  than five million business  establishments  covered
by the law, but only a few thousand  agents  budgeted  for enforcement,  the
authorities wiII  be forced  to enforce  sanctjons  selectively.3
The  purpose  of this  paper  is to assess  the potential significance  of
sanctions  for  resource  allocation and  income  distribution  in the United
States.  We  seek  to identify the industries Ijkely  to be most  affected by
the law and  provide  a sense  of the magnitude  of its  possible  effects on the
wages  of  legal U.S.  workers. The  paper  necessarily  draws  from  a number  of
fjelds  in economics,  including  the economics  of law  and  regulation, labor-2-
economics!  and  public finance.  0ur conclusions  are derived  by combining
basic theoretical principles from  these  fields with new  and  existing
estimates  of essential information  on the size and  industrial distribution
of the illegal  alien workforce  and  the potential for technical substitution
between  l  abor groups.
Through  the course  of the analysis, a number  of difficult  choices  have
to be made  regarding  key issues  in enforcement  and  compliance. Our  generai
philosophy  is to bias our assumptions  toward  making  sanctions  more
successful  in achieving  thejr  intended  objectives.  For example,  we  assume
that the authorities deploy  their  inspection  resources  with the objective
of minimizing  national employment  of i11ega1  aliens.  This is in l'ine  with
the expnessed  purpose  of the 1aw,  but it  ignores  the possibility  that the
authorities will  be pressured  to be less selective and  ]ess efficient  in
thejr monjtoring  in order to avoid  charges  of racial djscriminat'ion. As
another  example,  we  assume  that employers  can  costlessly distinguish
between  legal and  illegal  workers.  This ensures  that the wages  of
competing,  legal workers  will  be favorably  affected the law.  Yet many
critics  claim that,  because  of counterfeiting, employers  will  not know
whether  they are hiring 1ega1  or lilegal  workers.  If  the courts are not
lenient in cases  involv'ing  counterfeit documents,  employens  may  reiect
1ega1  appljcants  with characteristics that are similar to those  of illegal
aliens.
Our  basic method  of analysis is to view sanctions  as a tax on the use
of i11ega1  immigrant  labor by employers  targeted  for inspection  by the
immigration  authorities.  The  penalties are levied on a per worker  basis.-3-
Therefore,  if  employers  know  the probabilities of detection, are risk
neutral  , and  have  no ethical or moral  reservations  about  disobeying  the
1aw,  they will  respond  to sanctions  as they would  a tax levied at a rate
equal  to the fine times  the probability of detection.
Much  of our analysls of employer  sanctjons  follows the standard  theory
of factor tax incidence.  There  is one  addjt.ional  layer of complication,
however. It  is  not immediately  apparent  which  industries face high
effective tax rates and  which  industnies  face lotv  rates.  The  law  contains
no specific provisions  as to the pattern of enforcement. It  is  left  up  to
the immigration  authorities to decide  which  industries to monitor  and  with
what  jntensity.
We  assume  that the immigration  authorities allocate their  limited
inspection  resources  with the objective of minimizing  the number  of illegal
aliens working  in the domestic  economy.  In this  framework,  a principal
determinant  of the intensity with which  an industry is monitored  is the
concentration  of illegal  workers  at an individual business  establlshment.
Data  from  the i980  Census  of Population  are used  to estimate, for all  U.S.
industries thought  to employ  large numbers  of illegal  workers,  the average
number  of illegal  aliens working  at an individual establishment  shortly
before  the passage  of the new  law.  This information  is  used  to rank order
the industries in terms  of the intensity with v/hich  they are likley  to be
moni  tored.
Having  determined  which  industries make  the best targets for
inspection,  we  carry out a general  equilibrium  analysis under  alternative
assumDtions  about the overall  level  of  enforcement.  In each  enforcement-4-
regime,  the econony  is partitioned jnto two sectors: one  consisting  of
industries to be heavily monitored  and  another  compri  sed  of industries to
be lightly  monitored. The  effective tax rates in the two sectors  are
chosen  to conform  to the rules for optimal  deployment  of inspectjon
resources, Incidence  calculations are made  uslng  a general  equilibrium
model  simjlar to those  commonly  used  in studies  of partial  factor taxes.
The  analysis provides  estimates  of the effects of employer  sanctjons  on
U.S. production,  the real wages  of low- and  high-ski11  1abor,  and  the size
of the i  l  legal al  ien workforce.
The  paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  I  provides  a simple  model
of the enforcement  pattern chosen  by the immigration  authorities.
Industries Iike'ly to be  monitored  most  closeiy are identified.  Section  I1
serves to  revievr  the basic theory of  how  employer  sanctions affect  U.S,
labor markets  and  to identify the parameters  that are crucial in
determining  how  effective sanctjons  can  be in r"educing  the supply  of
illegal  labor and  raising the wages  of competing  labor groups. Section  III
prov'ides  a numerical  analysis of the range  of effects that sanctions  could
have  on production  and  wages  ln the U.S. economy.  The  principal
conclusions  of the article  are sunmarized  in Section  IV.-5-
I.  Industry  Enforcement  Pattern  s
Three  assumptions  are centt"al  to our analysis of enforcement  of
empioyer  sanctions.  The  assumptions  are: (1) that the budget  authorjzed
for enforcement  is  inadequate  for achieving  complete  compliance;  (2) that
enforcement  patterns are sufficiently  predictable  for employers  to know
their  chances  of being  inspected;  and  (3) that the goal of enforcement  is
to minimize  the number  of i11ega1  aliens working  in the economy,  i.e.,
achieve  maximum  compliance  with the law.
The  assumptlon  of a limited budget  is a safe one.  In other countfies,
immigration  authorjties do not receive  enough  resources  to eliminate
illegal  alien workers  from  their  economies.  Consequently,  large numbers  of
illegal  aliens have  remained  after  the introduction of sanctions  in liestern
Europe,  Canada,  and  Hong  Kong.4 Th."" are good  reasons  to expect  the
experience  in the United  States  to be the same. The  cost of monitoring
increases  rapidly as additional employers  are brought  under  surveiliance.
Also, illegal  immigration  is a controversial issue, making  widespread
support  for a large enforcement  budget  difficult  to obtain.5
The  assumption  of a predictable  enforcement  strategy is also consistent
with exi  sting practjces.  The  authoritjes could  make  thejr  inspectjons
unpredictable. Uncertainty  about  the probability of detection, even  if
that probability  is  low, can  serve  as a deterrent.6  However,  experience
and  the plans of the Immigration  and  Naturaljzation  Service  (INS), as
reported  in testjmony  before  Congress,  sugges!  that the authorities will
behave  predictably,'  Law  enforcement  agencjes,  from  the internai revenue-6-
service  to the local police, display a strong  tendency  toward  predictable
emphasi  s on specific targets.
Our  for"mulation  of the authoritiesr enforcement  oroblem  has  much  in
common  with recent  work  on the theory of income  tax auditing [e.g.,
Reinganum  and  hrilde  (i985) and  Graetz,  Reinganum,  and  Wilde  (1986)1.
Employers  are divided into audit classes,  with assignment  based  on
obtainable  information  that is correlated  wjth the tendency  to violate the
larv.  The  probability of audit is  then conditioned  on audit class.  Audlt
probabilities are selected  with the partjcular objective of minimizing  the
size of the i llegal working  population.  This accords  with the expressed
purpose  of the law.  It  is  also consistent  with certain aspects  of iNS
behavior,  such  as the allocation of resources  to assist employers  in
distinguishing legal from  illegal  appljcants.
A. A simple  model  of enforcement
We  now  provide  a simple  charactenization  of the enforcement  problem  of
the immigration  authoritjes.  Suppose  that establishments  are identical
wjthin industries.  Let rj  denote  the fractjon of alI  establishments  in
industry i  to be inspected  (i=1,...,M).  Thus,  n, represents  the
probabiiity of inspection  for any individuai employer  in industry j.
Employers  take the n, as given  and  react to the sanctions  as they would  a
tax levied at a rate equa.l  to the expected  penalty.
The  authorities choose  the rj  in such  a way  as to mjnimjze  I  arEr,
where  a. is the number  of illegal  workers  per establishment  and  E. is the
JJ-7-
number  of establ  j  shments  i  n i  ndustry  j.  A di  spl  acement  of i  11ega1  workers
is achieved  not by seizure  and  deportation, but by raising the full  cost of
employing  an illegal  worker.  Establishment  jnspections  are subject  to a
budget  constraint.  For present  purposes,  suppose  that all  jnspections
consume  the same  quantjty of resources  and  that a maximum  of R inspections
are possible  under  the given  budget.
hlith this  notation,  we can write  the enforcement  problem  of the
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To carry the analysis  further,  we need  a production theory that  can be used
to relate a. and  E. to r..  Suppose  that production  functjons are jinear
J.JJ
homogeneous  and  that the ratjo of business  establjshnents  to industry
output is  fixed and  exogenous  for each  industry.  The  demand  for  illegal
labor then has  a simple  structure.  The  term  aj  is proportional to the
quantity of illegal  workers  that minimjzes  unjt cost, a function that
conveniently  summarizes  the technical substitution possible  between  illegal
labor and  other factors of production,  The  term  E. is  pnoportional  to the
'Ieve 
l of industry output.-6-
In addition to simplifying the form  of the labor demand  functions, the
assumptions  of I inear homogeneity  and  fixed establishment  size provide  the
enforcement  theory  with a structure that is compatible  I{jth general
equilibrium  models  commonly  used  in tax jncidence  studies.  A ljmitation of
the assumptions  is that they exclude  the possibility  of employers  escaping
detection  by r"educing  plant size.  The  analysis assumes  that the primary
way  employers  can  avoid  being  fined is by substituting legal inputs for
illegaf  inputs.
Another  issue to be addressed  before  analyzinq  (1) concerns  the amount
of information  assumed  to be available to the authorjties when  they decide
on an allocation of inspection  resources. At one  extreme,  the authorities
could have  a complete  understanding  of the economy  and  fully  anticjpate
changes  in al  I  economic  variables.  0therwi  se, the authorities could have
only a partial  knowledge  of the demand  for  illegal  labor.  tle assume  that
the authorities know  the current values  of all  economic  variables and  have
a general  understanding  of the reductions  in alien employment  that are
possible  from  technical facton substjtution, e.g.,  they know  the
economy-wide  compensated  elasticity  of demand  for  illegal  labor.  However,
they do not anticipate induced  changes  jn industry outputs, the net i11ega1
wage,  or any  other factor price.  0f course,  with their  informatjon  limited
jn this way,  the authorities may  find themselves  in error after  all
adjustments  have  been  made. Thus,  in the incidence  anaiysis jn Section
III,  we  focus  on inspection  patterns that are optimal under  (1) when  all
endogenous  variables assume  their  general  equilibrium values.-9-
With  the enforcement  problem  now  well-defjned,  the Kuhn-Tucker
condit.ions  can  be  written as
n.,(aZlan.)  < 0, (1-n.)(a7/at,)  > 0, and  0 s n.3I  (2)
JJJJJ
where
az/ar. = {E,/(w+n.f;111.ef  + p(w+n..f)}  j  = 1,...,M.
JJJJJ
Notation  not previously introduced  is as follows: (w+nrf) 'i  s the full  cost
of employing  an illegal  worker,  with w denotjng  the net wage  earned  by
illegal  jmmigrants  and  f  the fine per detected  violation;  e is the
economy-wide  compensated  elasticity  of demand  for  illegal  1abor,  defined  to
be negative;  and  u js the Lagrange  multiplier,  which  can  be interpreted as
the reductjon  in total  alien employment  made  possible  by an incremental
jncrease  in the enforcement  budget.
Under  current provisions  of the law, the schedule  of fines is
sufficiently  steep  that an employer  is  unl  ikely to employ  iilegal  vtorkers
if  detection  is certain.8  This precludes  n- = 1as  an optimal  solution.
J
But it  may  be optimal to inspect some  jndustries with little  or no
frequency. The  condjtions  given in (2) heip to identify  lhose industries
that will  and  those  that lvill  not be monitored  by the authorities.
Assuming  that the optimal  enforcement  pattern is  unique  and  that the
Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  are both necessary  and  sufficient,  the frequency  of
jnspection  for  industry  j  will  be positive if  and  only if  azlarj  ls
negative  when  n, = 0 and  all  other variables  are evaluated  at their  optimal
values.  Whether  this condition is met  depends  crucially  on the term  ar,-  10-
the I'alien intensityrr  of the industry.  Let m  denote  the index  of the
marginal  industry, j.e.,  the industry for which  6z/arn= 0 when  n, = 0.
Then  it  follows from  (2) that jt  is optimal  to monitor  a given jndustry if
and  only if  jts  initjal  aljen intensity exceeds  the jnitial  alien intensity
of the marginal  industry.  The  reason  for this  result is  straightforward.
For industnies  wjth a 
.large 
initial  number  of i11ega1  workers  per
establi  shment,  a large reduction  in aljen employment  can  be obtained  with
the first  do11ar  spent  on jnspection.
Condition  (2) can  also be used  to derive a formula  for the optimal  rate
of tax on industries  with a positive probability of inspection.  By
expressing  u in terms  of the parameters  of the marginal  industry, and  then
substituting the result jnto (2), we  have
1+t, = a,  /a,n, (3)
where  tj  is the tax rate expressed  as a percent  of the net illegal  wage.
The  formula  gJven  in eq.(3) wi.l  I be used  later to compute  an enforcement
equilibrium.  At this  point, it  is  instructive to identify  some  additional
properties  of an optimal  pattern of enforcement.  Given  Lhe  Fresence  of a,
in the formula, it  is  clear that some  noncompliance  is  optimal even  within
the set of monitored  industries.  The  formula  also il lustrates the
intuitive  result that effective tax rates will  be hiqhest for industries
that are most  alien intensive.-ll-
B. Identification  of monitored  industries
To identify the industries likely  to be monitoned  most  closely by the
immigratjon  authorities, we  estimated  the number  of illegal  workers  per
establishrnent  in U.S. industnies  shortly before  the passage  of the new  law.
The  estimates  were  developed  by combining  existing research  on the size of
the i11ega1  alien population  with our own  analysis  of the industry
dj  stribution of illegai  immigrant  workers.
Much  valuabie  information  on the illegal  aljen population  has  been
obtained  from  the 1980  Census  of Population. Analysis  indicates that the
il1ega1  population  is  large, but not as large as many  had  claimed  during
the mid 1970s. Census  Bureau  research  places  the number  of i11ega1  aliens
in the country  in 1986  between  3 and  5L  million.9  Thls range  is based  on a
count  of the illegal  aliens represented  in the 1980  Census  together  wjth an
estimate  of the rate of illegal  jmmigration  during the 1980s. The  annual
floli estimate  was  derived from  a 1983  survey,  while the rate of illegal
immigration  from  Mexico  is  thought  to have  risen sharply in recent  years
with the detenioration  in the Mexican  economy.  After adjustjng for a
possible  downward  bjas in the Census  figures, jt  is reasonable  to consider
7 million as an upper  bound  for the size of the i11ega1  alien population  in
1986.
To estimate  the industry distribution  of illegal  workers,  we  obtained
information  from  the Public-Use  Sample  of the 1980  Census  on the industry
locations of employed  indivjduals who  were  born outside lhe United  States
and  whose  ability  to speak  English  was  poor.  Language  proficiency has  a'l  so-  rz-
been  used  by Pearce  and  Gunther  (1985)  and  McCarthy  and  Valdez  (1986)  as a
selection variable to gain jnformation  on the illegal  alien population.
The  procedure  suffers from  two shortcomings:  it  fails  to identify
undocumented  aliens from  English-speaking  countries  (Canada,  Ireland,
Jamaica,  etc.);  and  jt  fails  to exclude  refugees  from  Cuba,  Vietnam,  and
other countries  who  have  been  granted  legal status.  Nejther"  of these
errors would  seem  to jntroduce  a significant amount  of bias into the
results, however, Census  Bureau  research  indicates that the great majority
of i11ega1  aliens are indeed  from  non-Eng1i  sh-speak'i  ng countrjes.l0  And  it
is  unimportant  whether  immigr"ant  refugees  have  received  legal status if,
because  of simjlar skills  and  handicaps,  they are distributed across
industries in the same  way  as illegal  immigrants.
Because  of special provisions in the new  immigration  law to meet  the
seasonal  needs  of agriculture, we  considered  only nonagricultural
industries when  preparing  our list  of penetrated  industries,  Due  to
ljmitatjons of sample  size, we  also excluded  any  industry estimated  to have
employed  less than 3,/4  of one  percent  of the iilegal  labor force.  This
left  us wjth the 31 industries shown  in Table  1.  Together  these  industries
accounted  for 74 percent  of il1ega1 nonfarm  employment.
The  first  column  in Table  1 shows  horv  illegal  aljen workers  are
distributed across  U.S. industries.  0f alI  the iilegal  aliens engaged  in
nonfarm  employment,  47 percent  are in manufacturing  and  39 percent  are in
service-producing  jndustries (not shown). The  four industlies employing
the largest number  of illegal  aliens are apparel  manufacturing,
restaurants,  construction, and  food processing.- LJ-
In an optimal  enforcement  strategy, it  is  not necessarily  the
industries that employ  large absolute  numbers  of i1'lega1  aliens that will
draw  the most  attention from  the immigration  authorities.  Surveillance  is
more  likely  to be focused  on industrjes with a large number  of illegal
worKer  s at an indivjdual establishment. Estimates  of this  jndustry
characteristic are shown  in the second  column  of Table  1.  To  obtain these
figures, |,e first  computed  the number  of illegal  aliens employed  in each
industry by multipiying the frequencies  in the first  column  by an estimate
of the total  number  of i11ega1  aliens working  in nonagricultural  industries
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during 1986."  The  absolute  employment  figures were  then standardized
using  data on number  of business  establishments.
First  note the wjde  range  obtained  for the nurnber  of illegal  workers
per establishment. There  are more  than 15 il1ega1s  per establishment  in
footwear,  apparel, and  food processing, Restaunants  and  construction,  on
the other hand,  average  no  more  than I  illegal  worker  per establjshment.
The  disparity in these  numbers  has  two important  implications: first,  that
enforcement  of sanctjons  will  not be unjform  across  industnies  and, second,
that it  will  prove  increasingly  expensive  to extend  surveil  lance  throughout
the economy.
The  figures in the table also reveal that manufacturing  industries are
predominant  among  industries with a large number  of illegals  at an
individual establishment. 0f the 21 industries having  an average  of 2 or
more  illegal  workers  per establ  ishment,  only 4 are not in manufacturing.
Thus,  to the extent that enforcement  is more  thorough  on large employers,
i11ega1  aliens in manufacturing  will  be displaced  more  extensively  thani11ega1s  jn other sectors  of the economy,  such  as construction  and
serv  i  ces.
Sensitivity of ordering  to omitted  factors.  Up  to this  point, we  have
assumed  that the cost of monitoring  a business  establ  ishment  is  fixed and
independent  of the size of the establishment. It  is likely,  however,  that
the cost of monitoring  also varjes with the total  number  of workers  in the
establ  ishment. in this  event, an optimal enforcement  pattern calls  for a
concentration  of surveillance  on jndustries viith not only a large number  of
iilegal  workers  per establ  ishment,  but also a large ratio of i11e9a1
workers to  total  workers
Shown  in the third  column  of Table  l  are estimates  of the ratios of
illegal  to total  workers  fon the 31 penetrated  industries.  The  results
indicate that industries with a large number  of illegal  aliens per
establishment  also tend  to use  a high ratio of illegal  to total  workers.
This can  be seen  by comparing  the figures in the second  column  with those
'in the third  column. The  simple  correlation coefficient between  the two
sets of figures is  .14.  0f the 15 industries with the largest number  of
aliens per establi  shment,  9 are in the group  of fifteen  with the largest
ratios of illegal  to total  wonkers. And  of the 6 who  are not in this
latter  group,  only hospitals stand  out as having  an exceptionaily  1ow  ratio
of illegal  to total  workers.
The  calculations in Table  l  are based  on national totals  for  numbers  of
i  1  1ega1  workers  and  numbers  of busi  ness  estabi  i  shments. Thi  s refl ects our
belief  that more  can  be learned  about  the long-run  effects of sanctions
from  a model  that presumes  a high degree  of national mobjlity jn  labor and-r5-
capjtal than from  a model  in which  there are per"sistent  geographic
jmmobilities.l2  Nevertheless,  the current geographic  distribution of
illegal  aliens is  highly skewed  and, at least in the short run, enforcement
efforts  are likely  to be focused  on particular states as well as particular
industries.
To  determine  how  sensitive our ordering  of industries is to the
geographic  concentration  of i11ega1  aliens, vve  recalculated  numbers  of
aliens per establishment  using  only information  from  the five  states
California, Florida, Iliinois,  New  York, and  Texas. These  states account
for three-quanters  of the iilegal  nonfarm  workforce,  but only one-third of
alI  U.S. nonagricultural  workers.l3  The  new  ordering  of industries
differed  little  from  the one  in Table  1.  0f the 31 penetrated  industries,
14 failed to change  posjtion, 13  moved  up or down  by only one  or two
positions, and  only 2 moved  more  than three positions,
II.  Labor  Market  Adjustments
Sanctions  against  employers  of illegal  workers  act as a tax on the use
of illegal  immigrant  labor by industrjes targeted  for  inspection  by the
immigration  authorjtes.  A detailed incidence  analysis is provided  in the
next section.  Here  we  review  the basic allocative effects 0f the policy
and  set out the parameters  that are crucial in evaluating its  effectiveness
in reduc'ing  the supply  of illegal  workers  and  raising the wages  of
competi  ng, i egal workers-lo-
The  primary  impact  of employer  sanctions  is on the market  for  illegal
immigrant  1abor.  Figure  1 shows  how  the policy is likely  to affect the
wages  of i11ega1  workers  and  the location of the'ir employment.  There  are
tv/o  sectors  in the domestic  economy.  Sector  A consists of industries
subject  to inspection  by imm'igration  officials.  Sector  B comprises  al1
other industries, with enforcement  in these  industnies  considered
negligible.  The  left  panei  in the figure shows  the supply  of illegal
workers  and  the demand  for these  workers  by industries in sector B.  These
relationships are used  to derjve the excess  supply  schedule  shown  in the
right pane1. The  market  for  illegal  immigrant  labor is  in equilibrium  when
the excess  supply  from sector B equal  s the demand  from sector  A.
The  effect of sanctions  is to reduce  the demand  for  illegal  labor in
sector  A.  This drjves down  the immigrant  wage  from  w to w'.  Because  of
the expected  penalty, however,  the cost of illegal  labor rises fon
industries in sector  A.  As a result,  (NA-N'A)  workers  are displaced.
(N-N') of these  workers  wjthdraw  from  the national labor market.  The
remaining  (N'B-NB)  workers  find employment  in sector B where  the cost of
1abor,  as g'iven  by the immigrant  wage,  is now  lower.
As background  for Section  III,  we  now  jdentify the basic parameters
that determine  how  effective employer  sanctions  can  be in reducing  the
supply  of illegal  immigrant  labor.  The  formula  presented  below  is derived
from  a standard  comparative-statics  analysis of the single-market  model.
The  solution has  been  simplified by assuming  that the elasticity  of demand
for il legal labor js  the same  in the two sectors.-17  -
drnN,/dsn(  1+r) = rA{re/(r-e  )  } (4)
Eq.(4) shows  the percent  change  in the supply  of illegal  workers  (N)
resulting from  a one  percent  rjse in (1+t), where  t  is  the ad valorem  tax
rate for  firms in sector  A.  The  size of the decline in N is  seen  to depend
on three parameters:  the fraction of alI  i1legal workers  employed  in the
enforced  sector (lO), the elasticity  of supply  of illegal  immigrant
labor (1),  and  the elastjcity  of demand  for illegal  labor (e).  The
directions of influence  IO and  n have  on the solution are straightforward.
The  percentage  decline in N  will  be greater the larger is the fraction of
the illegal  workforce  employed  in sanctionable  industries and  the more
lrage-elastic  is the supply  of illegal  1abor.  The  role of e in the solution
is  less obvious,  but equally as determinate. If  the demand  for  i11ega1
labor is highly elastic,  a large number  of illegal  aliens are displaced
from sector  A.  This is offset by the fact that, wjth an elastic demand  for
labor throughout  the economy,  it  is easier for firms in sector B to absorb
displaced  workers,  The  latter  effect cannot  dominate,  however. 0n
balance,  greater reductions  in the illegal  workforce  are achieved  the more
elastic  is the demand  for  i1lega1  1abor.
In addjtion to the effect  sanctjons  have  on the supply  of iIlegal
inmigrant  labor, there is considerable  interest in the way  they affect the
wages  of competing  labor groups. As shown  by Ethier (1986),  the results
depend  greatly upon  whether  employers  can  d.i  stinguish between  legal and
i ll ega1  workers.  l,le  wi  I  I  assume  that  l egal and i l l  egal workers  are
costlessly distinguished.  Thjs impl  ies that the wages  of legal workers  are
only altered through  normal  channels  of input substitution.-18-
To keep  things simple, consider  a model  in which  there are two
markets--the  market  for  illegal  workers  and  a market  for a competing  group
of legal workers,  referred to as legal low-skil  l  labor.  As before, treat
the sanctions  pnogram  as a tax on the use  of illegal  workers  by industnies
jn sector  A,  Then  the sanctions  again  serve  to raise the cost of il1ega1
labor for firms in the enforced  sector and  to  lower  the cost of i11ega1
labor for all  other employers. Whether  lhe wage  of lega) low-skilI workers
rises or fa11s  depends  upon  what  happens  to the aggnegate  demand  for that
labor.  Suppose  the two labor groups  are subst'itutes.  Firms  in the
enforced  sector are encouraged  to use  more  1ega1  workens. But firms in the
unenforced  sector have  the opposile  incentive.  Depending  upon  the relative
strengths  of the two effects,  the 1ega1  low-skill  wage  may  ejther rise or
fall.
The  tension in the 1ega1  low-skill  labor market  is  resolved  in eq.(5).
The  solution given  there has  been  simpl  ified  by assuming  that demand
elasticities  are the same  across  sectors  and  that leqal labor is  in fixed
supply.
denwl,/dcn(1+t)  = srr{\6n + (r*-rig)(-err)i/D
D  = -er,_(rr-err)  - rLIrlL
(5)
where
In the above  equation,  ril denotes  the 1ega1  low-skil1 wage,  s*  the
elasticity  of demand  for  factor i  with respect  to the price of factor k,
and  I--  the fractjon of labor group  i  employed  in sector  j.  The  subscnipts
I and  L refer to i11ega'l  and  1egal  labor, respectively.-  19-
Market  stability  requires  that the denominator  in eq.(5) be positive,
Thus,  the direction of change  in w,_  hinges  on the sign of the numerator.
For the wages  of 1egal  workers  to ri se, jt  is  sufficjeht  that ELI ? 0 and
ILA  t  IIA.  The  first  condition is  satisfied if  the two labor groups  are
substitutes.  The  second  condjtion requires that the ratio of  illegal  to
legal 1ow-skill workers  be lowelin  the enforced  sector than in the
unenforced  sector.  If  this  is not the case, it  is possible  for the legal
wage  to fall  despite a substjtute relationship between  the labor groups.
For  this  to occur, however,  the supply  of i11egal  workers  must  be
relatively  wage  inelastjc and  the demand  for illegaI  labor relatively  wage
elastic.
IIL  I  nc  i  dence  Analysis
In this  section  we  provide  a numer"ical  analysis of the effects of
employer  sanctions  on resource  allocation and  jncome  distribution  in the
United  States.  The  analysis combjnes  the simple  enforcement  theory
presented  in Section  I with a general  equilibrlum model  commonly  used  in
tax incidence  studies.  The  enforcement  model  produces  a set of inspection
frequencies,  or tax rates, that are optimal given particular values  for
factor prices, commodity  prices, and  industry outputs.  The  general
equil  ibrium  model  produces  equil  ibrium  values  for prices and  outputs  given
parti  cul  ar va  lues for the tax rates.  An  enforcement  equi  l ibri  um  i  s
obtained  by solving the two models  simult"neour'1y.14-20-
A. The  general  equilibrium  model
The  model  used  to detail  the economic  effects of sanctions  is  similar
to the one  used  by Harberger  (1962)  in his pioneering  analysis  of the
1r
corporation  income  tax.rr  There  are two sectors  of production.  Sector  A
consjsts of industries that are subject  to heavy  monitoring  by the
authorities.  Sector  B comprises  all  other nonagricultural  industries, with
enforcement  there either light  or negligible.  What  is meant  by the terms
rrheavyrr  and  "light"  jn these  definitions will  be made  clear in a later
section.  Each  sector employs  four factors of production: i11ega1  immigrant
labor (I),  legal low-skill  labor (L),  legal high-skil1 labor (H), and
capital (K).  Productjon  in each  sector is governed  by constant  returns to
sca1e,  and  all  markets  are competitjve,  Employer  sanctions  operate  as
taxes  on the use  of i11ega1  immigrant  labor by firrns jn the two sectons  of
the economy.
!r/e  follow Jones  (1965)  in choosing  the mathematical  form  of the
equi  l  ibrium conditions.
.iA*A*ciB*B=Ni i = I,L,H (6)-(8)
wnere
N,  = F(r(w'p)), Nl  = N'r,  and  NH  = NH
r(w*,n)  = F*
X .iAn.i  + cIAwJtA  = p
(e)
(  10)-  Lt'




Eqs.(6)-(8) are fulI  employment  conditions  for the three labor markets.
The  left-hand sjde of each  equation  details the economy-wjde  demand  for the
particular  labor group.  The  demand  for labor of type i  by firms in
sector i  is written as the product  of the quantity of labor that minimizes
unit productjon  costs (c.,r) and  the level of sectoral output (xj).  Factor
supplies  are denoted  N,.  The  suppl  ies of 1ega1  low-skill  and  high-skil1 ''  I
labor are assumed  to be fixed.  The  supply  of illegal  immigrant  1abor,  on
the other hand,  is allowed  to vary with the real immigrant  wage. Assuming
that  jndjvidual preferences  are identical and  homothetic,  we  can  defjne the
real value of any  factor price w as the ratio of w to the minimum
expenditure  needed  to support  a fixed level of utiljty  at current commodity
prices.  The  term  r(w,p) 'i  s used  to represent  the general  function that
convarts  nominal  earn'ings  to real earnings,  For  computational  purposes,
ail  financial variables  were  measured  in terms  of good  B, which  serves  as a
numeraire. Thus,  the term  p which  appears  jn the real earnings  equation
denotes  the relative price of good  A.
The  supply  of capital is assumed  to be perfectly elastic with respect
to its  real reward. This allows for the possibjlity  of outflows  of capital
in response  to reductions  in the supply  of inrmigrant  1abor.  The  elasticity
condition is  imposed  ln eq.(9) where  the real return to capital is  held
constant.Eqs.(10)-(11)  are the competitjve  profit  conditions  for the two
sectors.  In a competitive  equilibrium, unit production  cosls must  reflect
market  prices.  Note  that costs are defined  to inciude the effective rates
of tax on employment  of i11egal  workers.  The  tax rates are expressed  as a
percent  of the wage  received  by i11ega1  immigrants  and  are denoted  tj.
Eq.(12)  is a simple  demand  condition used  to close the model. Under
the assumption  that community  tastes are identical and  homothetic,  the
ratjo  of the quantities consumed  of A and  B depends  only on the relative
commodity  pri  ce rati o.
The  model  described  by eqs.(6)-(12) serves  to determjne  seven  unknowns:
levels of output in the two sectors! the four factor prices, and  the
commodj  ty prjce natio.  Informatjon  required  to solve the model  includes
the effective tax rates and  a complete  specification of the various
functional relationships contained  in the equations. The  methods  used  to
obtain this  information  are described  'in the next two sections.
B. Defining  the enforcement  regimes
It  js djfficult  to predict how  much  of a budget  the authoritjes wilI
receive to enforce  the new  imm'igration  1aw.  Indeed,  given  an interest
gr"oup  theory of government,  it  js reasonable  to expect  that the budget  wiI1
vary with cycl  ical  fluctuations in the economy  IShughart,  Tollison, and
Kimenyi  (1986)l and  with changes  in the age  distribution of the U.S.
population.  ltje  consider  three possible  enforcement  scenarios, The
scenarios  range  from  a minimal  level of enforcement--in  which  only large-  L3-
employers  are monitored  for compliance--to  a very ambitious  campaign--in
which  a significant amount  of surveillance  js carrjed out in all  pafts of
the economy.
Each  enforcement  regime  js defined  by partitioning the economy  into trrto
sectors  and  then choosing  an effective tax rate for each  sectof.  Thjs is
accomplished  in accordance  with the basic principles of optimal enforcement
outlined in Section  I.  The  three reqimes  are defined  as fol lows.
Low  enforcement. Insoections  are assumed  to be I imited to industries
initially  employing  an average  of 2 or more  il1egal aliens per business
establ  ishment. Sector  A consists  of all  such  industries as identified in
Table 1.  Sector  B comprises  all  other nonagricultural  industries.
Included  wlthin the enforced  sector, therefore, are virtually  all  of the
penetrated  manufacturing  industries.  Noteable  within the unenforced  sector
are the restaurant  and  construction  industries.
FoIlowing  our discussion  in Section  I,  the average  rate of tax for
industries in sector  A can  be determined  from
l+tA = aAlam, (13)
where  the marginal  industry is defined  as having  an initial  value  of aj
equal  to 2.0.  The  tax rate for  jndustries jn sector B is zero, by
assumption.
Medium  enforcement.  The  budgel  is  jncreased  to allow for some
monjtoring  of al  I the penetrated  industries.  Accordlngly,  sector  A is
broadened  to include  all  of the industries in Table  1.  The  average  rate of-L+-
tax in this  sector is determjned  from  eq.(13), with the margina1  industry
now  defined  by an jnitial  value  of a, egual  to 0.5.  Sector  B is made  up  of
all  nonagnicultural  industries not included  in Table  1.  The  effective tax
rate in this  sector is again  zero.
High  enforcement.  Sectors  A and  B are defined  as in the TTMEDIUivI"
enforcement  regime. However,  the budget  is  assumed  to be sufficiently
large to support  substantjal monitoring  efforts  jn both sectors.  Because
the alien jntensities in the two sectors  differ,  it  is not optimal  to
monitor  them  with the same  frequency. The  optimal  different'ial  in tax
rates can  be determined  from
(1+tA)/(  l+tr)  = aola,. (  14)
The  overal  i  level of taxation is chosen  to achieve  a 50-percent  r"eduction
in the il legal al  ien workforce.
C. Functional  specifications and  key  parameter  values
I,iithin  the equations  of the incidence  model  are a number  of functional
relationships that must  be specified before  the model  can  be solved.  These
are: the unit  factor demand  functions, the jmmjgrant  supply  functjon, the
real wage  funct'ion,  the product  demand  function, and  the alien intensity
functions.  Each  of these  functions is assumed  to take a geometric  form.
Thus,  each  has  a multiplicative  constant  and  exponents  which  give the
elasticities  of the functjon  with respect  to jts  indivjdual arguments.-25'
What  follows  is a brjef discussion  of the procedures  used  to evaluate  the
key  parameters  in these  functions. Additional  jnformation  is provided  in
an  appendix.
Unit factor demands.  Underconstant  retunns  to sca1e,  the c'  depend
with the price of illegal  immigrant  labor
multip'l  icative constants  in these
initial  values  for the labor demands  and
The  exponents  represent  the output-constant
As is well known,  these  elasticities  can  be
.j.,  = e,  .oj.,  for  ifk 'lK  KJ  rK
only on the four factor prices,
defined  to include the tax.  The
functi  ons  were  calculated  using
capjtalrs di  stri buti  ve shares.
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where  ,JrO is the compensated  elastjcity  of demand  for  factor i  in sector j
with respect  to the price of factor !,  eO,  is  the djstributive  share
awarded  to factor k in sector j,  and  oir*  is the elastjcity  of technical
substitutjon between  factors j  and  !  in sector  j.  Thus,  the ,i.,  ,.  can  be
calculated  using  initial  values  for the distibut'ive shares  and  the
elasticities  of factor"  substitution.
There  is a substantial econometric  literature  on factor"  substitution
among  labor of different  skill  types and  of these  labor types for capital  .
Using  information  provided  in a survey  by Hamermesh  and  Gnant  (1979),  we
were  able to assign  values  to oLH,  oLK,  and  or*.  There  are two deficient
areas  in the literature,  however. First,  estimates  of substitution
elasticities  are general  ly not available by detailed industry.  Therefore,-26-
the chosen  estimates  were  assumed  to apply  to all  industries in the
economy.  Second,  there are no  measures  of the technical substitution
possible  between  illegal  immigrants  and  other factors.  The  procedure  used
to evaluate  these  parameters  is as follows.
In our study, skill  classes  are defined  by educational  attainment.  The
low-skill  labor force consjsts of all  workers  who  failed  to complete  hjgh
school.  In terms  of education,  then, il1ega1  .immigrants  are ver"y  similar
to 1ega1  low-skill  workers.  For this  reason  we  assume  that the
substitution possible  between  each  of these  labor groups  and  high-ski11
labor or physical  capital is the same,  i.e.,  that oIH  = oLH  and  or* = o,-*.
This leaves  us  with dIL, the elasticity  of substitution between  il'legal and
lega1  1ow-skill labor.  Because  of differences  ln English  proficiency, the
two groups  are general  ly  not perfect substitutes.  But they are ljkely  to
be highly substitutable  with respect  to other job skill  attributes.
Given  values  for org, oIK, and  the distribut'ive shares  of aIl  facLors,
oIL can  be uniquely  determined  fnom  a knowledge  of e11, the economy-wide
compensated  elastjcity  of demand  for  illegal  immigrant  labor.16  It  js this
relationship that we  explo'it in evaluating  oIL.  Econometric  studies
indicate that the elasticity  of demand  for 1ow-wage  labor is around  -1.0
Isee Zucker  (1973)  and  Cotteri  ]I  (1975)1.  Because  illegal  immigrant  labor
constitutes a subset  of all  low-wage  1abor,  the demand  fon i11ega1  alien
workers  is probably  somewhat  more  elast'ic.  In our base  case  simulations,
we  assume  a value  of -1.5 for e'  which, in turn,  implies a value  of 11.8
for or,_. This provides  for a high degree  of substitutability  between
illegai  and  legal low-skill  labor.  A more  moderate  value  for o'  is
considered  in a sensitivity  exercj  se,Immigrant  supply.  The  key  parameteLin  the immigrant  supply  equation
is the wage  elasticity  of supply.  In thejr  survey  article,  Krugman  and
Bhagwati  (1976)  conclude  that elasticities  of migration  v/ith respect  to
destination  earnings  general  ly lie  between  0.5 and  2.0.  This range  is
consistent  with the results of Greenwood  and  McDowel'l  (1982)  who  find a
wage  elasticjty  of reported  emigration  from  Mexico  to the United  States  of
1.4.  Given  that our model  ignores  the downward  pnessure  on foreign wages
that would  accompany  immigration  reform,  vrhatever  elasticity  is chosen
should  be adjusted  downward.  In our base  case  simulations,  we  use  a value
of 1.0 for the elasticity  of i llegal immigrant  supply.
Real  wages. The  function r(w,p) converts  a lrage  denominated  in units
of good  B into a real wage. The  form  used  for r(w,p) was  w/p*.  This is
equivalent  to deflating w using  the minimum  expenditure  function that is.
dual to a Cobb-Douglas  utjljty  function.  Because  of an absence  of detailed
consumption  or value-added  data, the parameter  a was  measured  by the
fraction of total  nonagricultural  employment  accounted  for by industries in
secto  r A.
Product  demand.  The  key  parameter  jn the functjon G(p) js the
elasticity  of commod.ity  substitution along  a community  indifference curve.
To be consistent  vrit,h  the form  of the real wage  function, we  took this
elastj  ci  ty to be unity.
Al  ien intensities.  Gjven  our earl  ier assumption  of a fixed level of
output per business  establ  jshment,  the a, that appear  in eqs.(13)  and  (la)
can  be expressed  in terms  of the c,.  by means  of the following equation:-28-
o.  ,o aj = a-j(  cIj/c-Ij  )  ,
where  a0. and  cor. denote  the values  of a. and  cr.  in a pre-tax
J  !J  J  IJ
equilibrium.  tdhen  the index  i  refers to an entire sector, ao' is computed
by averaging  the information  in Table  1on  illegal  workers  pe"r
establishment;  (cr'./co.,.) is evaluated  using initjal  values  for the factor
IJ  IJ
prices and  the elasticities  of demand  computed  prev'iously  for the given
sector.  In the case  of the marginal  industry I,  ao, is  immediate  from  the
definition  of the marginal  industry.  More  problematjc  is the term
,  ,o
lcrr/c"1r).  It'i  s unclear  whether  this term should  be evaluated  using  the
elasticities  from sector  A or those  from sector B.  Both  methods  were
considered. Because  the two sets of elasticities  are similar,  there was
little  difference in the results.  The  reported  resuits were  derived  by
using  the elasticjties  from sector B to evaluate  lcrr/corr).
So that  the reader may  have  a better  feel  for  the data, Table 2 shons
some  of the basjc informatjon  used  to solve eqs.(6)-(14) for the "MEDIUM"
enforcement  regime.  In reviewing  the data, first  note the relatively  small
values  foLi 11ega1  laborrs  distributive  shares. Despite  a generous
assessment  of their  numbers,  illegal  workers  constjtute only a small part
of the total  resources  in the United  States  economy.  This implies that the
effects of sanctions  on aggregate  output  will  be small.  And  except  in
cases  where  factors are highly substjtutable for  i1'lega1  labor, it  also
means  that sanctions  will  produce  only moderate  effects on the earnings  of
other factors.-29-
Noteworthy  in the data on labor force allocations is that industries in
the enforced  sector employ  a somewhat  higher ratio  of illegal  to legal
low-skill  labor than  do industries in the unenforced  sector.  This is
indicated  by the inequality IIA > ILA.  As shown  through  eq.(5), this
condition serves  to moderate  the rise in the legai low-skill wage  that
occurs  in response  to employer  sanctions.
Regarding  the elasticities  of factor substitution, we  have  already
noted  the high vaiue initially  assumed  for orr.  The  remaining  figures
jndicate that h'igh-skill labor and  physical  capital are each  substitutable
for  Iow-skill  labor, and  that high-ski1l labor is  less substitutable  for
capital than is  low-skill  labor.
D. Resul  ts
Table  3 reports our numerical  findings for the thr"ee  enforcement
regimes. Rows  1.a-1.b show  the effective tax rates, with each  rate
expressed  as a percent  of the new  i11ega1  immigrant  wage. Shown  in rows
2.a-2.b are the percent  changes  in sectonal  outputs  resulting from  the
sanctions.  These  and  all  other percentage  changes  are computed  as
deviations from  the pre-tax equilibrium.  The  figures reported  in row  2.c
indicate the effect sanctions  have  on U.S. gross  domestjc  product  (GDP).
These  figures were  calculated  by averaging  the relative changes  in sectora'l
outputs using  the parameter  c from  the cost-of-l iving index.  Section  3 of
the table shows  the changes  in the real wages  of the three labor groups.
Section  4 details the effect sanctions  have  on the al  location  of illegal
alien workers. The  presentaLion  there is based  on the fol lowing  identity.-JU-
%ANI  : (rtA)(%aNIA)(ANr/aNrA)
The  percentage  change  in the supply  of illegal  alien workers  can  be
expressed  as the product  of three terms: (i)  the share  of the iliegal
workforce  jnitially  employed  jn sector  A, (ii)  the percentage  reduction  in
employment  of illegal  aliens jn sector  A, and  (iii)  the fraction of all
illegal  workers  dispiaced  from  sector  A that leave  the U.S. labor market.
This equation  wilI  serve  as a framework  for the interpretation of results.
llhen  enforcement  is  rrL0Wrr,  sanctions  have  small  effects on production
and  vages.  A weighted  average  of the changes  in sectoral outputs  shows
only a 0.S-percent  decline in the gross  domestic  product.  The  real wage
t"ate  of legal low-ski1l workers  rises--a result that is expected  and
desired  by most  supporters  of immigration  reform--but  it  rises only 2.6
percent.  Also small are the costs of sanctions  on factors that are not
close substitutes for  i11egal  workers.  In our model  , it  is high-skil1
labor that bears  the cost of immigration  reform  'in the long run.  Results
not reported indicate that a portion of this  burden  would  also fall  on
capital were  jt  not for an external market  for capital.
One  of the reasons  for the small size of these  effects is  that illegal
alien workers  account  for a smal  I  share  of domestic  value  added. Anolher
is  the fact  that,  under 'r  LOl,lrr  enforcement,  sanctions reduce  the supply of
illegal  workers  by only 11  percent.  Although  48 percent  of the illegal
workforce  is originally  employed  in sanct'ionable  'i  ndustries, surveillance
is only thorough  enough  to achieve  a 44-percent  reduction  'i  n employment.-31-
Taken  together, these  figures indicate that 22 percent  of a1l illegal
workers  are displaced.  0f these, only one-half  withdraw  from  the U.S.
labon  market.  The  other half find work  in sector B. where  enforcement  is
nonexi  stent.
If  enforcement  is  rrMEDIUMrr,  sanctions  have  a larger, but still  moderate
'impact  on the economy.  It  is only when  enforcement  is "HIGH"  that the
effects become  significant.  In this case,  employer  sanctions  succeed  in
raising the real wages  of  legal 1ow-ski1l  workers  by 12.8  percent,  doing  so
at the expense  of high-ski1l workers  who  suffer a real-wage  decline of 4.1
percent.  The  reason  these  effects are more  substantial  , of course,  is  that
the overall level of enforcement  js assumed  to be high enough  to reduce  the
illegal  alien workforce  by 50  percent.  Monitoring  is  sufficiently  vigorous
to double  the cost of illegal  labor for  firms in sector  A, resulting in a
68-percent  decline in thejr  employment  of i11ega1  aliens.  Because  sector  A
initially  accounts  for 74 percent  of the illegal  workforce,  this means  that
50 percent  of al  l  illegal  workers  are displaced.  Under  'rHIGHrr  enforcement,
firms in sector  B are also monitored,  and  with sufficient  intensity to
prevent  thein cost of illegal  labor from  falling.  As a result, virtually
none  of the workers  displaced  from  sector  A are absorbed  by sector B.
This, in itself,  requires  a substantial  monitoring  effort,  as is evident
from  the size of t^.
Implicit  in the move  from  rrLOWrr  to TTHIGH'r  enforcement  is a 
'larger
enforcement  budgel.  To see  what  is  involved, suppose  that the probability
of detection in sector  j  can  be represented  by the ratio  of total
inspections  (R'l)  to total  number  of establ  ishments  (E.).  Then,  for any
J  J'
enforcement  regime  i,  the effective tax rate can  be expressed  asi  ii  i
1'-  = (f 'Rr.,/w'_F'.)
.r  J  I-  j"
where  it  is understood  that the
with the regime. By  making  use
enforcement  efforts  impl  i  ci  t  i  n
equat  ion be1ow.
- JL-
i  ndustry  composi  ti on of
of this  relationship, we
any  two regimes, This i
sector j  varies
can  compare  the
s shown  in the







By  combining  data on numben  of estabi  ishments  with results from  the
incidence  analysis, it  is possible  to evaluate  Lhe  right-hand  side of
eq.(15).  Upon  doing so we  reach  a striking conclusion:  t,o  move  from  I'L0W'|
to "HIGHtr  enforcement,  and  to thereby  ach'ieve  a 50-percenl  rather than
1l-percent  reduction  in the illegal  working  population, requires  either a
26-fold increase  in the fine,  a 26-fold .increase  in the number  of worksite
inspections,  or some  combinat'ion  of the two,17 These  caiculations somewhat
overstate  the incremental  cost of achieving  broader  compliance. Large
establishments  take more  staff  time to inspect  than do small ones,  and
large establ  ishments  are more  prevalent  among  industries in the 'rL0W'l
regime.  Nevertheless,  it  is clear that the marginal  cost of enforcement
rises sharply  with the fraction of the i llega'l labor force to be removed
from the domestic  economy.-33-
E. Sensitivity experiments
There are two parameters  which are crucial  to  the success  of  a
sanctjons  program  but which,  at the same  time, are especially  difficult  to
evaluate.  These  are the elasticity  of immigrant  suppiy  and  the elastjcity
of substjtution between  iilegal  and  legal low-skil  l  labor.  Table  4 reports
the results of sensitivity  experiments  perfor"med  using  alternative values
for these  parameters  in the case  where  enforcement  is  '|MEDIUl4u.  To  make
the compari  sons  meaningful,  the tax rate tA was  chosen  to provide  the same
enforcement  effort  as that implicit  in the base 
"ur..18
The  figures in the first  two columns  show  the effects of reducing  the
elasticity  of immigrant  supply  from  1.0 to 0.5.  The  most  noteable
djfference belween  the two sets of numbers  is a significant drop in the
extent to which  sanctions  reduce  the illegal  iabor supply.  l4uch  of this  is
due  to the fact that, with the supply  of workers  more  wage  inelastic,  a
smaller  fraction of those  displaced  from  the enforced  sector end  up leaving
the U.S. labor market.  Considering  that our original assessment  of the
immigrant  supply  elasticity  was  generously  high, it  is qujte possible,
then, that reductions  in the i11ega'l  working  popu'lation  will  prove  even
more  exDensive  to obtain than our eariier  results indicated,
As previously noted,  the elasticity  of substitution between  illegal  and
1ega1  iow-skill  labor is derived  from  a value assumed  for the compensated
elasticity  of demand  for illegal  1abor.  In our initial  simuiations,  we
assumed  a value  of -1.5 for a-  which, in turn,  implied  a value  of 11.8  for-J+-
oIL.  This provided  for"  a h'igh  degree  of substitutability  between  i1'legal
and  legal low-skilI  labor.  In the third  column  of Table  4 we  show  what
happens  when  Lhe  demand  elasticity  is reduced  to -1.0 and  the corresponding
value for oIL falls  to 3.5.  With substitution between  the two labor groups
more  limited,  the benefits of immigration  reform  to 1ega1  low-skill workers
are greatly reduced. The  legal low-ski11  wage  rjses by less than
one-fourth  the amount  it  did in the base  case.  It  also becomes  more
difficult  to gain compl  iance  within the enforced  sector.  This jllustrales
the basic principle of tax theory that the more  price inelast'ic is demand,
the larger js the tax needed  to achieve  a given quantity reduction.
IV. Conclusions
With  more  than five million business  establ  jshments  subject  to
sanctions  under  the new  immigration 
'law,  jt  is unlikely that enforcement
will  be thorough  enough  to eliminate i11ega1  aliens from  the U.S. labor
force.  A more  Iikely  outcome  is that the immigration  authorities will
focus  their  enforcement  efforts  on industries with a large concentration  of
illegals  at an individual establi  shment. Information  presented  in this
article  indicates that manufacturing  industries are predominant  among  large
employers  of il legal aliens.  Thus,  the contractjonary  effects of
immigration  reform  are 1ike1y  to be felt  most  strongly in manufacturing.
0ther sectons,  such  as servjces  and  construction, which  employ  illegals
wjth a low  concentration  at the establ  ishment  level, ar"e  like1y to face
weak  enforcement  and  may  absorb  significant  numbers  of di  splaced  aliens.-Jf,-
Simulation  results for an jntermediate  enforcement  regime  indicate that
roughly  one-third of the h'orkers  displaced  from  the enforced  sector find
employment  in other parts of the u.S. economy.
The  incidence  of employer  sanctions  will  be uneven  across  factor groups
as  well as industries.  The  principal benefjciaries  wil l  be iegal workers
jn low-skill  occupations. Improvements  in their 
'l 
iving standards  are not
likely  to be large, however. For sanctions  to raise the real wages  of
legal low-skiiI workers  by ten percent, illegal  and  1ega1  low-skill  labor
must  be highly substitutable and  the law  must  be enforced  with sufficient
thoroughness  to reduce  the illegal  alien working  population  by as much  as
one-half.  The  costs of immigration  reform  wjll  be borne  primarily by
high-ski1l 1abor.  But the percentage  reduction  in their wages  will  be even
more  moderate.
Through  the course  of the analysis, a number  of difficult  choices  had
to be made  regarding  certain key parameter  values  and  basic issues  of
modeling. In the interest of conservatism,  these  choices  general  ly were
made  in a way  that enhances  the poss'ibi  lity  of the law achieving  expected
results.  Given  the nature  of our findings--that signifjcant reductions  in
the illegal  labor force wilI  be expensive  to obtain and  that any increases
in the general  level of wages  of lega1  low-skilI workers  will  be
moderate--the  fact that our assumptjons  were  conservative  only serves  to
strengthen  the basic thrust of the conclusions,-36-
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1 'For a summary  of the new  immigration  bill,  see  U.5. Congress,  House
Committee  on the Judiciary (1986).
?- -See,  for example,  the article by Recio,  Flynn,  Bernstein,  and  Staff
(  1e87)  .
I
"There  js evidence  that jllegal  aliens have  already  begun  to revise
thejr  expectations  about  the effectiveness  of the new  law.  Field
observations  at Canon  Zapata,  the busiest i11ega1  crossing  point along  the
U.S.-Mexican  border, indicate that the flow of illegal  immigrants  rose 15
percent  during the first  six months  of 1988  to a level approaching  that
recorded  just  before  the law  went  into effect  in November  1986. Data  on
border  apprehensions  by immigration  officials  show  a similar turnaround.
See  the report by Rohter  (1988).
-See  U.S. General  Accounting  Office (1985)  for commentaries  on the
effectiveness  of laws  that govern  the employment  of alien workers  in other
nations.
-For an analysis  of how  the opposing  positions of business  and
organized  labor have  been  reconciled  to produce  sma11  budgets  for bonder
enforcement,  see  Shughart,  To11ison,  and  Kimenyi  (1986).-ir-
C, -This principle is  noted  by Spicer  (1986)  jn his analysjs  of tax
evasion. Also see  Calvo  and  Wellisz (1978)  for a discussion  of the
efficiency of djscontinuous  and  unpredictable  monitoring  to discourage
shi  rki  ng among  empl  oyees.
'INS Commjssioner  Nelson  testified  that plans for enforcing  employer
sanctions  involved  targeting specific employers  for  intensive  monitoning.
See  A.C. Nelson,  'rStatement  by Alan C. Nelson,  Commisioner,  Immigration  and
Natural  ization Senvice,rr  in U.S. Congress,  House  Committee  on the Judiciary
(  1s83).
t'-, -The  law contains  a graduated  penalty system. First-time offenses
carry a $250  to $2,000  fine for each  i11e9al immigrant  hired.  By  the third
offense, the fjnes can  reach  as high as $10,000  per a1ien.  Employers
convicted  of a pattern or pracLjce  of violations can  also recejve  a
si  x-month  pri  son  term,
"See  Passel  (1986).  For  a general  summary  of the Ijterature  on
estimat'ing  the size of the illega'l alien population,  see  Slater (1986).
1n -"Seventy  percent  of the undocumented  aliens counted  in the 1980  Census
wene  from  Mexico,  Central  America,  or South  America. The  figure would
exceed  eighty percent  jf  one  were  to include non-Engl  ish-speaking
immigrants  from Europe,  Asia, and  the Caribbean. See  Passel  and  Woodrow
[1s84, p.656].-43-
11 ..The nonfarm  illegal  workforce  was  assumed  to be 4 million.  This
figure was  derived  by assuming  a total  popuiation  of 7 mil'l  ion and  then
making  al  lowances  for those  working  in agriculture, those  not \{orking  at
a1l, and  those  recei  vj  ng amnesty.
l2Regarding  the mobiljty of criminal activities,  there is an interesting
example  jn the case  of efforts  to reduce  the cultjvatjon of marjjuana.
Production  has  decl  jned in West  Coast  states, where  enforcement  has  been
concentrated,  but jt  has  rjsen in the Northwest  and  Southeast,  where
authorities have  been  less vigilant.  See  the report by Weiss  (1987)  and
recent testimony  offered in "Going  to Pot: Marijuana  Cultivation on Public
Lands  and  the Federal  Response,rr  U.S. Congress,  Committee  of the lllhole
House  on the State of the Union  (1987).
'"The figure on i11ega1  workers  derives from  our ana.lysis  of the 1980
Census,  as previously  described. The  figure is very similar to the
estimate  obtajned  by Passel  and  lCoodrow  (1984).  They  estjmate  that 81
percent  of all  iliegal  aliens reside in the five  states named  above.
l4This methodology  is  sim'i  lar to the one  used  by Graetz,  Rei  nganum,  and
Wilde  (  1986)  and  Dubin  and  Wilde  (1988)  in their  studies  of auditing and
income  tax compliance. In their models,  audits have  a deterrent effect on
income  tax evasion. There  is also a yield  effect of audjts, however,  so
that an increase  in comDl  iance  levels leads  to a decrease  in the auditrate.  These  t\./o  relationships are solved  simultaneously  to produce
equilibrium  audit rates and  compl  jance  levels.
1C '-See  l4clure  (1975)  for a general  survey  of the use  of the Harberger
model  in publ  ic finance.
loThe  theoretical relationship is  given  by
dIL  = (  1/BL)[-err-(eroar+e*ol-p)J,
where  0., is the aggregate  share  of factor i.
1'7
"The  interested reader  can  verify  this  result rgith  the aid of the
fol l  owi  ng information:
(a) Under  "L0W"  enforcement,  there are initially  275  thousand
'individual  establ  ishments  in sector  A.  In the 'rHIGHtr  enforcement
regime,  there are initially  1,544  thousand  establishments  in
sector  A and  3,115  thousand  estabiishments  in sector B.  Source
1982  Censuses  of U.S. Industries.
(b) Given  our assumptjon  of a fjxed level of output per establishment,
the number  of establ  jshments  in the post-tax equilibrium  can  be
computed  by combining  the numbers  in (a) with the information  on
%Ax,  provided  in Table  3.
(c) The  ratio w2,/wr, in eq.(i5)  is  .57.  Because  the price effects
II
are smal1,  a similar number  can  be derjved  from  the information  on
%Ar(wr,p)  g'iven  in Table  3.-45-
18Thi, is accomplished  by replacing  eq.(13)  with "tAwIxA  = toAwolxoA,"
where  a "o" over a variable indicates its  new  value in the base  case,-+o-
Appendix:  Initial  Equilibrium  Data  and  Parameter  Values
This section further details the sources  of data used  in the numerical
simul  ati  ons.
Employment  shares, The  sectoral distributions of employment  were
obtained  from information  in the Public-Use  Sample  of the 1980  Census  of
Population. The  employment  distribution  for  i11ega1  aliens was  estjmated
from  data on the industry iocation of lrorkers  who  were  born  outsjde  the
Un'ited  States, spoke  English  poorly or not at all,  and  spoke  a language
other than English in the home. The  employment  djstrjbutjon  of 1ega1
low-skjl  l workers  was  derived  from  data on working  individuals who  were  not
in the i1lega1  proxy  group  and  had  failed to complete  high school  .  Legal
high-ski11  workens  were  those  not jn the proxy  group  with at least a
hi  gh-school  educati  on.
Di  strjbutive  shares. The  computatjon  of distributive  shares  is
complicated  by a paucity of data on value-added  for nonmanufacturi  ng
jndustries.  For  each  sector, we  assumed  that laborrs aggregate  share  was
equal  to 0.6, the ratio of total  employee  compensation  to GNP. Values  for
the individual labor shares  were  derived  by combining  information  on
employment  shares  with data on the size of the three labor groups  and  thejr
relative wages. As stated in n.11, the illegal  nonfarm  workforce  was
assumed  to be 4 million  in 1986. The  numbers  of 1egal  low-ski'l 
'l 
and
high-ski1l workers  were  taken  from 1986  BLS  data.  The  wage  rate of i1legal
alien workers  was  assumed  to equal  that of 1ega1  low-skill  workers. As
suggested  by data in the 1980  Census,  the high-ski11  wage  was  taken  to be
30 percent  higher than the low-skil1 wage.Elasticities  of facton subst.itutjon. In selectjng  values  for dLH,  dLK,
and  dHK,  we  concentrated  on studjes  that had  derived  their  estimates  from
cost functions rather than production  functions.  As noted  by Hamermesh  and
Grant  (1979,  p.520), estimates  of Allen e'lastjcities of substitution
computed  from  parameters  of a production  functjon tend to have  large
standard  errors.  The  general  results from  these  studies  are that
high-skill  labor and  physical  capital are each  substitutable  for  low-skill
'labor, 
and  that hjgh-skil  l  laboli  s less substjtutable for capital than js
'low-skill 
labor.  The  parameter  values  shown  in Table  2 are consistent  with






















































































































ILLEGAL  ALIEN  II,ORKERS  IN U.S. INDUSTRIES
Canned  food  s
Leather  & footwear
Appare  1
Computers
Meat  p  roducts
Grai  n & bakery  products
lransport  equi  pment
Texti  I  es
Primary  meta  1  s
Hospital  s
Furn  i  ture & fixtures
Electri  cal machi  nery
Paper  & al  l ied products
Mi  sc. man  ufactu  ri  nq
Chemi  cal  s
Rubber  & plastics
Beverages  & mi  sc. foods
Department  store  s
Fabricated  meta  l  s
Educati  ona  l institutions
Hotel  s & motel  s
Servi  ces  to bui  I  di  ngs
lliholesal  e grocers
La  nd  scap  i ng
Lumber  & wood  products
Eati  ng  & drinking  places
C  leaners
Private  househol  ds
Con  stnucti  on
Auto  repa  i  r
Retai  l groce  r  s


































'Estimated  using  data  from  the 1980  Census  of population  on  the indusrry
location  0t worKers  who  were  born  outside  the united  states, spoke  English poorly  or not at all,  and  spoke  a language  other  than  English  in the iome.
?
. 
'Computed  as the number  of illegal alien workers  divided  by the numben  of
busi  ness  establ  i  shments.  Estimates  of i  I  l  egal  workers  were  obiai  ned  by
multjplying  the figures  in column  one  by an  estimate  of the total numbir  of
i11ega1  aliens  engaged  in nonagriculturil  employment  in 19g6. Data  on  number  of
business  establishments  were  taken  from  the 19g2  censuses  of u.s. Industries.
- 
-computed  as the number  of illegal alien workers  divided  by the total number
of workers. Estimates  of total  workers  were  made  by combining  19g0  census  data
on  the industry  location  of alI u.s. workers  wlth BLs  data  on  total nonfarm
employment  ln 1986.
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2.1Tabl  e 2
NUMERICAL  OATA  FOR  III4EDIUMII  ENFORCEMENT  REGIME
stri  buti  ve Shares nt S  hare  s
0rO  = .03  0r, = .01  IrO  = .74  Ir, = .26
eLA  = .07  0r, = .05  r*  = .61  lr, = .39
0rO  = .50  0r, = .54  IrO  = .48  rr* = .52
Elastic'ities of Factor  Substitution
or, = 11.8  or, = .75
oa*  = 1.0  or*  = .25Tabl  e 3
CALCULATED  EFFECTS  OF SANCTIONS  AGAINST  EMPLOYERS  OF ILLEGAL  ALIENS
Low Med  i um High
1. Effecti  ve tax rate  s




a. %A,x  ^
b  . %LxB
c.  %AGDP
Real wage  e  ffect s
a. %Ar(w.  .  o  ) '  1."'
b. %Ar(w,  .o) '  L-  '
c. %Ar(w,,  .  p  ) '  n"  -
Effects  on empl  oyment  of
i  1l  egal a  l  iens









































SENSITIVITY  RESULTS  FOR'tI4EDIUI,4N  ENFORCEMENT  REGII,IE
mmrgrant mmi  grants
Ba  se Supply  Le  ss
Case  El  asti  c
Low-S  ki  I  I Workers
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Real  wage  effects
a. %ar(w.  n  )
b. %Ar(wL,  p)
c. %ar(wg,n)
Effects on empl  oyment  of
i  11ega1  aliens
o'  nIA
b. %aNIA
c. AN  I,/ANIA
d. %aNI
-Jv
.  ob
-19
.74
-35
.74
-30
11